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Abstract 
The research examines the role of discussion in investors’ decision in a step-by-step 
information setting. Several studies present that disclosure strategy stimulates order-
effect bias, but simultaneous information decreases the impact of that bias. This bias 
makes people weigh more heavily to recent observations than they do to older ones. 
Using step-by-step information, a recency effect is expected to be found. This study 
uses an experimental method. The participants are the representation of non-profes-
sional investors in the stock market because of a lack of knowledge and experience. 
Participants are also a reflection of the customer easiness in registering to be stock 
traders. The role of discussion between participants is a new feature of this experiment. 
After evaluating participants’ decision in a discussion, the experiment shows that an in-
dividual’s choice after discussion produces more bias, although they already learn the 
information before the discussion. The research finds that (1) using the within-subject 
sample, group discussion produces overvaluation (undervaluation) in positive (nega-
tive) sequential information, (2) there is bigger price revision when negative sequen-
tial information is presented. This study suggests disclosure strategies for companies. 
Considering a recency bias, companies must present step-by-step information when 
they disclose good news, but they must avoid step-by-step disclosures when giving 
bad news. The second practical implication is for investors; they need to think about 
the benefits of joining an investor club, since the discussion exacerbates recency bias. 
These results are expected to contribute to finance literature.
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INTRODUCTION
In presenting corporate disclosures, companies may select two strate-
gies; those are simultaneous and step-by-step information. In step-by-
step (sequential) information, humans tend to experience recency bias 
(Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992). It means that people react more heavi-
ly to recent observations and experiences than they do to older ones 
(Fudenberg & Levine, 2015). This study also believes that argument. 
To reduce the impact of step-by-step information, Pinsker (2011) us-
es simultaneous information. Expanding the idea of recency bias, we 
discuss stock investing decision using group discussion as a treatment 
in the experiment.
Group discussion is an essential feature of this research. Ahlawat 
(1999) discusses the role of the group in an audit to overcome recency 
bias. We develop that idea. It gives a contextual aspect of stock trading 
practice. Investors process information from broker information, for-
mal disclosures of stock exchanges, television, and newspapers (Pring, 
1993). They usually face sequential information rather than a simul-
taneous one. Sequential information improves the power of recency 
bias. Investors are expected to improve their decision quality by re-
ducing bias. The idea adopts Chalos and Poon’s (2000) research. They 
© Dedhy Sulistiawan, Felizia Arni 
Rudiawarni, 2019
Dedhy Sulistiawan, Associate 
Professor, Department of Accounting, 
Faculty of Business & Economics, 
University of Surabaya, Indonesia.
Felizia Arni Rudiawarni, Assistant 
Professor, Department of Accounting, 
Faculty of Business & Economics, 
University of Surabaya, Indonesia.
discussion, order-effect, recency, step-by-step 
information
Keywords
JEL Classification G11
This is an Open Access article, 
distributed under the terms of the 
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International license, which permits 
unrestricted re-use, distribution, 
and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly 
cited.
www.businessperspectives.org
LLC “СPС “Business Perspectives” 
Hryhorii Skovoroda lane, 10, 
Sumy, 40022, Ukraine
BUSINESS PERSPECTIVES
2Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 16, Issue 3, 2019
http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/imfi.16(3).2019.01
use group discussions to enhance information sharing between members in budget setting. This study 
expands that research by using belief revision theory.
Many investors need media to discuss stocks and news in the market. Using internet forum, chat room, 
and mailing list, they join discussion and group chat before making the decision. There are many in-
vestor forums and trading chat rooms, for example, www.prompttrader.com, www.stockrants.com, and 
www.inthemoneystocks.com. Those sites provide group discussion media for investors. Our study tries 
to adopt that similar situation.
In investors clubs, investors expect that they will get better performance because of clubs. Conversely, 
a survey in the United States (US) market presents that the performance of an investment club is lower 
than that of the market (Nofsinger, 2002). In the stock market, there is a herding phenomenon (Nofsinger, 
2002). Investors tend to follow other investors’ decision. It means that a community makes them more 
biased. Those ideas are supported by data provided by a big broker in the US. Individual investors pro-
duce higher return than club performance (Barber & Odean, 2000).
This article provides an important finding. Using step-by-step information, group discussion after in-
dividual review enhances order-effect bias. Moreover, our findings demonstrate that group discussion 
produces a new sequence of information, and therefore, it stimulates recency bias.
This study contributes to the practical and theoretical aspects. Theoretically, this study gives benefit to 
behavioral accounting and finance literature. The presentation of the same information can lead to a 
different decision. If previous researches use individual decisions in the stock market without peer dis-
cussion, our study proposes the role of discussion. 
Practically, we expect to contribute to investing area. Public companies might also control their disclo-
sure to gain optimum results from disclosure presentation. Good news should be presented sequentially, 
and bad news should be performed simultaneously to generate a maximum positive reaction from good 
news and minimum negative reaction from bad news. For investors, this study gives insight to them 
about the contribution of discussion communities to their decision. 
Furthermore, our article is presented in several sections. The next section discusses the hypothesis 
development. The second one proposes a research design. The third section presents evidence, including 
a discussion of the findings. The last section concludes. 
1. THEORETICAL REVIEW 
AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT
Researches in auditing present evidence that 
auditors experience bias because of step-by-
step information (A. Ashton & R. Ashton, 1988; 
Trotman & Wright, 1996). From a law perspec-
tive, recency bias is also relevant. In a court, ju-
rors also face the same bias (Furnham, 1986). 
He tests the role of step-by-step information us-
ing actual transcripts from the court. Negative 
information followed by positive information 
(– – – – + + + +) for the first group and positive 
information followed by negative information (+ 
+ + + – – – –) for the second group results in a 
different decision. That study suggests that the 
right person can be convicted.
Conversely, because of the recency effect, some-
one can avoid punishment. This phenome-
non shows that the same information results 
in a different decision in the court. Based on 
A. Ashton and R. Ashton (1988), Trotman and 
Wright (1996), and Furnham (1986), we know 
that auditors and jurors are affected by the or-
der effect. Both analysts and investors may also 
be inf luenced by recency bias because of step-
by-step information.
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Libby and Tan (1999) report research using exper-
imental method in a stock market setting. They 
use stock analysts as their participant to decide 
on investing. The findings show that participants 
who are warned before earnings announcements 
weigh net income lower than those who received 
a simultaneous warning or no warning. It implies 
that step-by-step information influence analysts’ 
decision and valuation. Using the overreaction 
hypothesis, DeBondt and Thaler (1990) also pres-
ent evidence that analysts overreact to new infor-
mation, which is used to estimate future earnings. 
They focus on last earnings information than the 
previous one to predict future earnings.
Tuttle et al. (1997) support the idea that investors 
are not fully rational. They present evidence that 
people weigh on more recent information. Pinsker 
(2007) reports experimental research using the 
stocks market context. He chooses accounting un-
dergraduate students as participants. The hypoth-
esis contains positive information that would pro-
duce higher (lower) valuation in positive sequen-
tial (simultaneous) information. 
Pinsker (2011) expands the idea of Pinsker (2007). 
He uses both non-professional investors and stu-
dent as participants. He hypothesizes that longer 
sequential information does not generate recency 
bias, but it produces primacy bias. Based on his 
argument, participants do not become sensitive in 
responding to extended sequential information; 
therefore, there is no order-effect bias (Hogarth & 
Einhorn, 1992). But even though they expect the 
primacy bias phenomenon, their experiment finds 
that participants still experience the recency effect. 
Hellmann et al. (2017) also discuss a recency effect. 
They present that graphical information is not able 
to reduce a recency bias of nonprofessional inves-
tors. The study of Pietsch and Messier (2017) ex-
pands the recency bias study by adding complexity 
and time pressure. Those variables affect individu-
als’ belief revision.
Literatures presented above give support to the 
idea of the recency effect. Human decisions are 
affected by order of information. Step-by-step 
information generates bias. Therefore, the same 
information with different order can yield differ-
ent results. Recency bias must be minimized. In 
a mitigation study, Trotman and Wright (1996) 
explain that order-effect bias due to familiarity 
problem. To examine those arguments, they use 
three groups of participants. They are firm man-
agers, senior auditors, and accounting students. 
Their experiment finds that both accounting stu-
dents and senior auditors are still influenced by 
step-by-step information, indicating that they 
experience recency bias. Participants who are au-
dit managers are not affected by that sequential 
information. These findings imply that human 
experience may minimize recency bias. Audit 
managers have more experience than both the 
senior auditors and accounting students.
In previous research, Sulistiawan and Alvia 
(2010) test recency bias using technical and fun-
damental information in a stock market setting. 
They also use positive-negative (negative-posi-
tive) step-by-step information. To eliminate the 
recency bias of technical-fundamental (or fun-
damental-technical) information, they provide 
training for participants. Overall, their results 
present that recency bias can be minimized by 
training. From a different perspective, Ashton 
and Kennedy (2002) use a self-review to mini-
mize recency bias in going concern judgments. 
They present evidence that self-reviews miti-
gate recency effect that is caused by step-by-step 
information.
This study adds an essential method by using de-
cision after discussion. One way to make a deci-
sion is to engage people and institutions through 
collaborative approaches, in which the results of 
this collaboration can be used to justify decisions. 
Martelli et al. (2015) call this condition as so-
cial dialogue approach. In the discussion, group 
members are expected to minimize bias and to 
improve decision quality (Solomon, 1982). This 
study refers to Chalos and Poon (2000) for the 
use of discussion. They present the role of dis-
cussions to expand information sharing between 
members. That condition is expected to boost its 
performance. Developing that idea, this study 
uses group discussion to enhance individual de-
cision. The role of discussion is evaluated after 
participants make personal decisions. If Ashton 
and Kennedy (2002) select self-review to mitigate 
the recency effect, this research uses personal re-
view after discussion. 
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Bienberg (2011) classifies behavioral accounting 
research (BAR) by the focus of the study: the indi-
vidual, group, organization, or the society within 
which accounting exists. He classifies pure choices 
and strategic studies in individual studies. This ex-
periment evaluates decision using strategic studies. 
Like a chess game, the actor explicitly should con-
sider the behavior of other actors. In the discus-
sion, participants can discuss the choice of other 
participants in a group decision. The phenomenon 
is contextual in stock market studies. This study 
also finds that the GPA does not affect recency bi-
as. It means that on average, the best member of 
the group cannot reduce recency bias.
Using group discussion is very contextual for re-
tail investors’ situation. Accordingly, everyday 
stock traders (investors) face new information 
from many sources, for examples television, email, 
newspaper, investment communities, TV, broker 
recommendations, and other sources. To deal with 
such a lot of information, they may follow (or al-
so actively participate) on investor club discussion 
to share and discuss the news. Moreover, investor 
clubs are considered to give benefit to investors. 
Improving decision using group discussion pre-
sents a strong argument to support the hypothe-
sis, but there is no evidence that group discussion 
mitigates recency bias in stock market decisions. 
This study also argues that group discussion cause 
bias. Libby and Tan (1999) describe that partici-
pants also weigh their decision based on the last 
information they received. If analysts suffer bias 
in sequential information, their recommendation 
should contain misleading information. Usually, 
analysts are role model for either naive or unso-
phisticated investors in developing their invest-
ment decisions. As a result, when “the expert” 
provides a bias recommendation, their followers 
suffer a loss on that decision. 
Libby and Tan (1999) and DeBondt and Thaler 
(1990) present evidence that bias affects profes-
sional analysts, because they tend to react to new 
information. Expert analysts will increase the in-
formation level to be larger than it should be. This 
condition, in turn, will also drive market partic-
ipants to generate higher (lower) reaction than it 
should be. This overreaction leads to good (bad) 
news. DeBondt and Thaler’s (1985) study also 
presents the existence of investors’ overreaction. 
Investors tend to buy stocks that other investors 
like; this is called herding phenomenon (Nofsinger, 
2002). When this condition is present, the mar-
ket price becomes irrational, and stocks become 
overvalued. 
Related to investment clubs, many investors 
hope that they produce profit, because they join 
the clubs. Conversely, a survey presents that the 
average performance of an investment club is 
lower than that of the market (Nofsinger, 2002). 
Using data from one of the top brokers in the US, 
Barben and Odean (2000) present that individu-
al investors’ produce higher return than club per-
formance. Those ideas imply that clubs or groups 
may not give a positive contribution to individual 
investors.
In this article, we use a non-directional hypothe-
sis to express our expectation about recency bias 
phenomenon, because the role of discussion in the 
context of investing is still not clear. Some groups 
believe that discussion produces positive impact, 
and others do not. Our prediction is stated as 
follows.
Hypothesis: In stock investing, group discussions af-
fect recency bias.
2. EXPERIMENTAL METHOD 
2.1. Participants 
This experiment uses final-year students as partic-
ipants. Undergraduate students in an accounting 
program are selected because of several reasons. 
They represent non-professional investors in the 
stock market because of a lack of knowledge and 
experience. Students are also a reflection of the 
customer easiness in registering to be stock trad-
ers or investors in brokerage firms. Both groups 
of practitioners and students are affected by or-
der-effect bias in investing decision (Pinsker, 2011; 
Trotman & Wright, 1996; Libby & Tan, 1999). 
2.2. Procedure 
This study uses the short-series of information. The 
focus of this experiment is the use of discussion to 
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the decision in a step-by-step information setting. 
Related to the use of sequential information, Libby 
and Tan (1999) use only two-sequential informa-
tion. Turtle et al. (1997) and Alvia and Sulistiawan 
(2010) examine recency bias using four sequen-
tial information. Our experiment provides six-se-
quential information. More extended sequence is 
used to generate more significant magnitude of bi-
as. Stronger effect is needed, because our analysis 
focuses on the role of discussion. Furthermore, the 
disclosure of good and bad news is adapted from 
Pinsker (2007) who uses ten positive (and nega-
tive) declarations. In this experiment, sequential 
information is divided by good (bad) news to pro-
duce the positive (negative) reaction. 
In our experiment, participants in each group 
(Groups 1 and 2) receive step-by-step information. 
They have to determine their judgments (without 
group discussion). After the last information is re-
ceived, experimenters announce to participants to 
join in a group that is randomly determined by the 
experimenter. There are three to four participants 
in each group. In that group, they receive the same 
step-by-step information as presented in an indi-
vidual session. Finally, every participant performs 
a new valuation based on the discussion. 
We also use between-subjects test by using Groups 
3 and 4. Groups 1 and 2 have to repeat the ses-
sion. First, they face step-by-step information (+ + 
+ – – – or – – – + + +). Second, they join groups 
to discuss any companies’ information and to de-
cide individually. Groups 3 and 4 directly follow 
the second session.
Students as participants give the response in 
which their decision is not driven by financial in-
centive (Pinsker, 2007, 2011). Based on that idea, 
this experiment does not provide a financial in-
centive. We offer a snack to participants after the 
experimental process. 
In the experiment, all of the participants are giv-
en a company background. They must determine 
their initial valuation to the company. This exper-
iment uses reference price. That is 40-60. The ini-
tial assessment is needed to minimize bias from 
the contrast effect that may arise because of un-
dervaluation or overvaluation in their initial belief 
(Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992).
In sequential information, all participants are 
asked to (1) assess the good (bad) news by giving 
21 points scales from –10 to +10, (2) re-estimate 
the company’s share price based on new disclo-
sure and their initial value. They have two minutes 
in each exposure. After the first disclosure is com-
pleted, participants continue to answer the second 
to sixth disclosures. In the experiment module, 
there is a statement that participants are not al-
lowed to revise their belief and reopen disclosure 
presented before. Experimenter provides five min-
utes for the package of sequential exposure. 
In Groups 1 and 2, after independent assignments, 
instruments are collected by the experimenter. 
Participants of Group 1 and 2 are asked to join 
in a group discussion that is randomly designed. 
Participants in Groups 1 and 2 receive the second 
assignment that is identical to the first assign-
ment. This study uses a within-subjects test. This 
experimental procedure interacts between Ashton 
and Kennedy (2002) on self-review and Chalos 
and Poon (2000) on a group assignment. The du-
ration after the decision is three minutes in each 
disclosure.
2.3.	Hypothesis testing 
This study also analyzes the within-subjects test 
by comparing participants’ valuation before and 
after group discussion. In Group 1 (Group 2), de-
creasing (increasing) average score of participants 
imply that group discussion is useful (useless). 
Participants’ reaction is examined using a paired 
sample t-test. A nonparametric statistical test is al-
so used to complement our analysis. The hypoth-
esis is tested using the Wilcoxon signed rank test.
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
3.1.	Results
This study uses embedded check manipulation to 
evaluate the magnitude of good (bad) news. Based 
on our findings, bad (good) news is responded by 
negative (positive) price revision. It implies that 
the participant’s response is similar to the direc-
tion of information. The reaction is identical to the 
report. The results indicate that our instruments 
are informative to participants. 
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The first findings are listed in Table 1. In testing 
the hypothesis, we use a within-subjects test. After 
comparing participants’ decision before and after 
group discussion using step-by-step information, 
our experiment evaluates the impact of discussion 
on investors’ belief revision. The choice before the 
discussion was conducted after participants re-
ceive information presented in + + + (– – –). The 
valuation is 84.72 for positive news and 32 for nega-
tive information. The results show that disclosure + 
+ + after discussion leads to higher valuation. That 
is 86.38. Participants’ decision based on adverse 
disclosure after discussion generates lower esti-
mate. That is 27.66. These findings show that group 
discussion is not able to mitigate recency bias in 
step-by-step disclosure. The differences are statis-
tically significant. Valuation after the discussion is 
higher (lower) in positive (negative) step-by-step 
information.
Using a decision based on price revision also reach-
es the same conclusion in stock valuation decision. 
The results are presented in Table 2. Group discus-
sion with information + + + (– – –) results in 30.83 
(–22.66). After discussion, we find that participants’ 
valuation is 32.22 (–29.33). Both series generate 
higher (lower) prices revision compared to the inde-
pendent decisions without discussion. Statistically, 
our results present that only negative disclosures in 
between-subjects analysis exhibit statistically signif-
icant result (t value = 5.292; sig < 0.01). 
Overall, the results report that group discussion 
generates bigger order-effect problem. To comple-
ment the findings, we also use a between-subjects 
test (see Tables 1 and 2) by adding Groups 3 (+ + + 
– – – without discussion) and 4 (– – – + + + without 
discussion). The findings suggest that group dis-
cussion does not affect recency bias. 
3.2.	Discussion 
Step-by-step information is common in our capital 
market system, especially when firms announce 
their disclosure. Our goal is not to show recen-
cy bias, but we try to evaluate the importance of 
discussion in the investment decision. To assess 
the usefulness of discussion, we need to produce 
bigger recency bias. Using step-by-step informa-
tion adopted from Pinsker (2007, 2011), we present 
Table 1. The results of stock valuation using group discussion
Description Step-by-step information Group Valuation t value
Stock valuation (between-subjects) 
+ + + 
Group 1 independent (n = 18) 84.72
1.458*Group 1 discussion (n = 18) 86.38
 – – –
Group 2 independent (n = 18) 32
2.303**Group 2 discussion (n = 18) 27.66
Stock valuation (between-subjects) 
+ + + 
Group 1 independent (n = 18) 84.72
0.164Group 3 discussion (n = 17) 85
– – –
Group 2 independent (n = 18) 32
0.464Group 4 discussion (n = 19) 31.31
Note: *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Table 2. The results of price revision using group discussion
Description Step-by-step information Group Price revision t value
Price revision (between-subjects) 
+ + + 
Group 1 independent 
(n = 18) 30.83 1,045
Group 1 discussion (n = 18) 32.22
– – –
Group 2 independent 
(n = 18) -22.66 5.292***
Group 2 discussion (n = 18) -29.33
Price revision (between-subjects) 
+ + + 
Group 1 independent 
(n = 18) 30.83 0.317
Group 3 discussion (n = 17) 30.29
– – –
Group 2 independent 
(n = 18) -22.66 0.438
Group 4 discussion (n = 19) -23.42
Note: *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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recency bias in step-by-step disclosure. Therefore, 
the role of the discussion can be examined.
Ahlawat (1999) performs an experiment in an 
audit context. She gives evidence that discussion 
helps auditors to mitigate recency bias. Our exper-
iments expand her idea by using investing setting.
Our research provides evidence that valuation 
(and price revision) after discussions stimulate 
the recency effect. Participants’ decision pro duces 
overvaluation when receiving positive informa-
tion and undervaluation when receiving nega-
tive information. Discussion with prior informa-
tion processing generates higher recency bias. It 
means that the use of discussion in step-by-step 
information produces lower quality of decision in 
investing setting. The results are different from 
Ahlawat’s (1999). These divergent results may be 
due to varying contexts between auditing and 
investing.
Our results implicitly support Barber and 
Odean’s (2000) findings. They present that indi-
vidual investors produce a return that is higher 
than investment clubs in the US. Using primary 
data from a major broker in the US, they eval-
uate investors’ performance. Our results also 
indicate that discussion reduces the quality of 
decisions. Based on our analysis, one of the lim-
itations in our experiment is that we do not pro-
vide a mentor in the group. When the member 
of group discussion is not the expert, they cre-
ate new step-by-step information in their dis-
cussion. They will join the “crowd” as explained 
in herding theory.
Expanding the discussion, Lipe and Salterio (2000) 
and Dilla and Steinbart (2005) present that knowl-
edge and training improve decision-making qual-
ity. The use of a mentor or an expert in a discus-
sion may produce lower recency effect. More sig-
nificant bias due to the discussion is similar to the 
herding phenomenon (Nofsinger, 2002). Investors 
choose to buy (sell) stocks because of other inves-
tors’ reaction rather than their own decision to the 
firms’ disclosures.
CONCLUSION
The use of the within-subjects test, individual decision before and after group discussion produces more 
prominent recency bias. The decision quality is lower when an individual decision is affected by group 
discussion. Learning process before the discussion is not adequate to reduce order-effect bias. In the 
supplementary analysis using between-subjects test, we also present evidence that discussion is not able 
to minimize recency bias. 
Theoretically, for the behavioral literature, this study supports the results of previous research that peo-
ple tend to be exposed to recency bias, including participants in the stock market. Furthermore, the 
result of this study also shows that group discussions – aimed at minimizing recency bias – turned out 
to exacerbate the effects of the recency bias.
There are two crucial implications in this study. First, companies must present step-by-step infor-
mation when they report good news, but they must avoid step-by-step disclosures when giving bad 
news. Step-by-step information on the excellent news aims to maintain market belief, so the mar-
ket continues to react positively. Conversely, for the bad news, companies that have some bad news 
should announce it simultaneously. The market will provide penalties for any bad news disclosed 
by the company. Giving bad news by step-by-step means giving a negative effect continuously to 
the market, and this results in the market continuing to provide punishment to the company. By 
giving bad news simultaneously, the sentence received by the company is only once. This method 
is used to avoid far more severe penalties if the bad news is given in step-by-step way. Second, peer 
group discussions produce more bias. Peer group discussion will cause new additional sequential 
information, which in turn will aggravate the recency bias. The result implies that investors need 
to evaluate the benefits of joining the investor community. 
8Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 16, Issue 3, 2019
http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/imfi.16(3).2019.01
This research needs some improvements. In this experiment, we do not use graphical information or 
time pressure to stimulate the discussion process. The impact of treatment using peer discussion is not 
keen to minimize bias, so we need to use other means to improve decision quality. The results of this 
study open opportunities for future research by involving variables to mitigate the impact of group 
discussion. 
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